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The recent upsurge in interest in the role of emotions in politics is not a coincidence, but
linked  to  our  current  political  situation:  We  have  extreme  nationalism  in  India,
authoritarians like Erdoğan and Orbán, as well popular far right political parties like the
French National Front in Europe, and right-wing populists[1] like Trump and Bolsonaro in
power in the US and Brazil. According to the sociologist Cas Mudde in his book The Far
Right Today there is something new in this situation compared to a few decades ago: During
most  of  the  postwar  era,  the  far  right  was  seen as  a  “normal  pathology”  of  western
democracy,  that  is,  as  essentially  a  pre-modern  fringe  phenomenon,  ideologically
unconnected to modern democracy, and supported by just a small minority of the population
(Mudde, 2019, 106-107).
 
The current emotional climate and the populist far right
Today’s situation is different according to Mudde; the far right is no longer a “normal
pathology”  but  a  “pathological  normalcy”,  in  that  the  far  right’s  talking  points  about
immigrants and minorities to a large degree have been mainstreamed, and mainstream
values – support for the nation-state and law-and-order policies– have become radicalized.
Drawing on international surveys, Mudde claims that that large part of the population hold a
combination  of  authoritarian,  nativist,  and  populist  attitudes,  combined  with  anti-
establishment sentiments.  Hence,  the populist  far right differs from the mainstream in
degree rather than kind; “the populist radical right does not stand for a fundamentally
different world than the political mainstream; rather it takes mainstream ideas and values to
an illiberal extreme.” (Mudde, 2019,170-171).
 
Angry White Men?
One emotion that has been at the forefront of the public debate about the current shift in
politics is anger. During the presidential race, Trump told CNN: “I’m angry, and a lot of
other people are angry, too, at how incompetently our country is being run.” and continued:
“As far as I am concerned, anger is okay. Anger and energy is what this country needs.”
While most thought that Trump would soon be out of the race, a psychology professor at the
University of Massachusetts who had studied anger as a social phenomenon is reported to
have commented the following: “He understands anger,” “and it’s going to make voters
feel wonderful.” [2]
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The American sociologist Michael Kimmel also links the rise of the populist far right to the
anger  of  a  specific  demographic,  which  he  explores  in  Angry  White  Men:  American
Masculinity at the End of an Era. Based on interviews with members of the American far
and extreme right, Kimmel suggests that ”Populism is not a theory, an ideology; it’s an
emotion. And the emotion is righteous indignation that the government is screwing ’us.’”[3]
(Kimmel 2017, xi.). A rather obvious response is to link this anger to the huge increase in
economic inequality in the last decades – both in the west and globally – and as a reaction to
an out-of-touch political establishment. This is the view of for example Thomas Piketty who
in in The Guardian explained Trumps victory as “primarily due to the explosion in economic
and geographic inequality in the United States over several decades and the inability of
successive governments to deal with this”.[4] According to Kimmel, however, it is not the
poorest, but white men from the downwardly mobile middle and lower middle class who
form the backbone of the far right, and this also holds for the extreme right (i.e. neo-Nazis
and white supremacists).[5] Kimmel found that the anger of his informants was driven by a
sense of having been duped, that a “tacit contract” had been broken: the understanding that
the government was ”for the people” and that if they worked hard they could support their
families and retain their self-respect.[6]
Kimmel stresses that while economic inequality has risen dramatically in the US  (”We are
more unequal economically than at any time since the Gilded Age”) at the same time as
society has become more equal when it comes to race and gender, and these two different
processes have somehow fused in the minds of these white men who feel anything even
remotely approaching equality as a catastrophic loss. (Kimmel 2017, xi, 281). In Kimmel’s
view, it is thus precisely the very belief in the meritocracy of ”The American Dream”, and a
deep and abiding faith in America, its institutions and its ideals that is the ”tragic flaw” of
the  angry  white  men:  A  rhetoric  of  masculinity  combined with  racism,  nativism,  anti-
Semitism and antifeminism serve to resolve the tensions in their worldview and enable them
to fix blame for their suffering. They are firm believers in capitalism, the free market and
free enterprise but hate corporations, patriots who love America but hate its government. In
short, the story Kimmel gives us in Angry White Men is about the misdirected anger of a
declassed group: ”America’s angry white men are right to be angry, but they are delivering
their mail to the wrong address. That mail is now a letter bomb, and it will take a nation to
defuse it.” (Kimmel, 2017, xiv). According to Kimmel, the anger of lower middle-class white
men has a specific character; it is a fusion of two sentiments – entitlement and a sense of
victimization, what he terms “aggrieved entitlement”. They believe that they are entitled to
benefits  and  a  status  that  have  been  taken  away  from them,  and  it  is  this  sense  of
entitlement (i.e. their whiteness and maleness) which leads them to identify – socially and
politically – with those above, even when they have economically joined the ranks of those
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who have historically been below them.[7] This aggrieved entitlement gives rise to a sense
of lost masculinity:
As they saw it, they’d lost some words that had real meaning to them: honor, integrity,
dignity. They’d lost their autonomy, their sense of themselves as “somebody.” And, as I
heard them say it, they’d lost their sense of themselves as men. Real men. Men who built
this country and who, in their eyes, are this country. (Kimmel 2017, x)
Kimmel does not only stress economic motives for the anger of a downward moving middle
class, but explicitly links “aggrieved entitlement” to a traditional notion of masculinity which
equals manhood with power and domination. These men feel powerless but still entitled;
they have a strong sense that they ought not feel this way, and that fuels anger. As he
phrases it: ”they are humiliated—and that humiliation is the source of their rage” (Kimmel
2017, xi). The anger that stems from ”aggrieved entitlement” can mobilize politically – but
only in a nostalgic fashion, as attempts to restore that which one feels has been lost.
(Kimmel 2017, 24). Angry White Men ends on a note of cautious optimism; the angry white
men are a rearguard in a lost fight, since the clock cannot be turned back neither on
women’s liberation nor racial equality. As Kimmel sees it, the anger’s address is women and
racial minorities, but the ”engine” of the rage is the growing chasm between rich and poor,
and the sinking middle class. Kimmel’s ”remedies” are therefore classical social democratic
politics of solidarity with one’s economic class, unions, social safety nets, and New Deal.
 
Age of anger?
A more global – as well as more pessimistic – perspective is offered by Pankaj Mishra in Age
of Anger: A History of the Present.  Mishra describes his project as an exploration of a
”particular climate of ideas, a structure of feeling, and cognitive disposition from the age of
Rousseau to our own age of anger.” (Mishra 2017, 28-29). His starting point is the paradox
that  while  we in  today’s  global  market  are  more literate,  interconnected,  healthy  and
prosperous than any other time in history, we still find ourselves in what he call ”an age of
anger”, with authoritarian leaders manipulating the discontent of furious majorities: ”The
world at large –from the United States to India – manifests a fierce politics of identity built
on  historical  injuries  and  fear  of  internal  and  external  enemies.”  (Mishra  2017,  170).
Mishra’s intuition (which he, as we shall see, shares with Martha Nussbaum) is that liberal
political theory has gravely underestimated the importance of emotions in politics and that
the traditional liberal model of the rational citizen  – which focused on material progress
alone – is fundamentally wrong; we are in fact less motivated by a rational pursuit of our
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own interests than by the fear of loosing honor, dignity and status, the distrust of change
and the appeal of stability and familiarity, as well as negative emotions such as envy and
ressentment:  ”Those who perceive themselves as left behind by or humiliated by a selfish
conspiratorial  minority  can be  susceptible  to  political  seducers  from any point  on the
ideological spectrum,  for they are not driven by material inequality alone.” (Mishra, 2017,
114).
Mishra attempts to cast light on a wide range of phenomena from identitarian movements to
ISIS and Hindu nationalism by comparing them to nationalism, proto-fascism and nihilism in
19th century  Europe through a  reading of  early  modern critics  of  the  Enlightenment,
especially Rousseau. In Rousseau (”history’s greatest militant lowbrow”) he sees one of the
first to criticize the belief that the interplay of individual interests could produce harmony
and civilization; on the contrary, due to our ”amour propre” – a kind of mimetic self-love
that always compares oneself to others and seek status and recognition from them – a
commercial society will end in envy and hatred (both of ourselves and others). A society
based on competition, emulation and the power of money, might promise progress, but is
psychologically debilitating for its citizens. (Mishra 2017,113). His main point is that the
violent reaction to modernism by those left behind, those who do not feel that they benefit
from the promise of progress, prosperity, stability and individual freedom, are not some
atavistic  remnants  of  the  pre-modern,  but  rather  intimately  linked  to  effects  of  the
modernization-process itself.
The global situation today is thus read as a repetition of the European backlash to the
modernization  process  in  the  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth-century.  This  reaction  is
furthermore not a case of simple opposition between modern and traditional but rather what
he with a psychoanalytical twist calls ”mimetic desire”; those gripped by resentment will
mimic the very groups they claim to oppose: ”The key to mimic man’s behavior lies not in
any clash of opposed civilizations, but, on the contrary, in irresistible mimetic desire: the
logic of fascination, emulation and righteous self-assertion that binds the rivals inseparably.
It  lies in resentment,    the tormented mirror games in which the West as well  as its
ostensible enemies and indeed all inhabitants of the modern world are trapped.” (Mishra
2017, 161). On the one hand, this story is that of “latecomers” to the globalized modernity,
but  on  the  other,  it  is  about  inherent  contradictions  in  the  modern  project  itself:
Modernization  dismantles  premodern  social  structures,  beliefs  and  communities,  and
urbanization uproots masses of people. While many traditional structures was intensely
unequal and deeply unfair, modern society promises equality  while its economic system
generates inequality:
The  ideals  of  modern  democracy  –  the  equality  of  social  conditions  and  individual
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empowerment – have never been more popular. But they have become more and more
difficult, if not impossible, to actually realize in the grotesquely unequal societies created by
our brand of globalized capitalism. (Mishra 2017, 28-29).
In short: The rise of inequality in a world that believes in equality breeds resentment: ”… an
intense mix of envy and sense of humiliation and powerlessness, resentment, as it lingers
and deepens, poisons civil society and undermines political liberty, and is presently making
for a global turn to authoritarianism and toxic forms of chauvinism.”  (Mishra 2017,14).
Unlike righteous anger, resentment is an inhibited and impotent emotion which lacks proper
expression, a kind of constant simmering that eventually might build up to an explosion.
Ressentiment is thus according to Mishra a distinctly modern phenomenon ”inherent in the
structure of  societies  where formal  equality  between individuals  coexists  with  massive
differences in power, education, status and property ownership.” (Mishra 2017, 336). What
held  liberal  societies  together,  Mishra claims was the promise of  future  progress  and
equality, which they have failed to deliver. When it comes to what to do in our age of anger,
Mishra does not give us any answers, but warns us that the neglect of emotions in politics is
dangerous, because if we do not acknowledge our need for belonging and identity, this will
only be offered by the extreme right in the form of exclusion and persecution of  ”the
Others”. Not just inequality, but also a lack of ”spiritual substance” in society is part of the
problem,  and  at  the  end  of  his  book  Mishra  refers  to  Pope  Francis  and  his  call  for
compassion with the poor as  an important  and hopeful  political  figure,  while  in  other
settings he has argued that socialism must be revived as an ethical project.[8]
Marta Nussbaum on fostering a political culture of compassion
Martha Nussbaum attempts to rectify this lack of focus on the emotions in liberal political
theory that Mishra criticizes in Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice. We do not
only need principles,  she claims,  we should also think of  strategies to actively employ
certain kinds of emotions in order to create a more just, redistributive and inclusive society.
It is both mistaken and dangerous to suppose that only fascist or aggressive societies are
intensely emotional and that only such societies need to focus on the cultivation of emotions:
“All political principles, the good as well as the bad, need emotional support to ensure their
stability over time, and all decent societies need to guard against division and hierarchy by
cultivating appropriate sentiments of sympathy and love” (Nussbaum 2013, 2–3).
Nussbaum’s  vision  is  a  liberal  society,  that  is,  one  in  which  there  is  an  overlapping
consensus  about  fundamental  principles  and  constitutional  ideals  without  a  common
comprehensive view of ”the good life”. So the challenge is how to foster political emotions
Emotional Politics – Some notes on anger, resentment and
compassion
through leadership, education, government policy and culture without impinging on liberal
principles such as pluralism and personal autonomy. Rather than following the idea of civic
religion from Rousseau and Comte, she follows a thread through Mozart (sic!) Mill and
Tagore with emphasis on aesthetic education: public artworks, monuments, parks, festivals
and celebrations, humor and comedy, songs, symbols, official films and photographs, but
also the rhetoric of politicians, public education, and even the public role of sports. Liberal
democracies should cultivate certain emotions, Nussbaum claims, including love of country
in the form of patriotism, although not in a form that romanticizes one’s own country, but
loves it – warts and all. She argues that patriotism helps people ”think larger thoughts and
recommit themselves to a larger common good” (Nussbaum 2013, 3).
Worthy projects require effort and sacrifice, and among such worthy causes Nussbaum
mentions national  defense,  economic redistribution,  inclusion of  previously  excluded or
marginalized groups and protection of the environment. I am not going to discuss patriotism
and its problems here, but only mention that while a form of patriotism might function
“progressively” in the US (She refers here to Luther King’s speeches and Roosevelt’s New
Deal) playing up patriotism would probably only exacerbate xenophobia in European nation
states. Nussbaum defends patriotism for liberal societies generally, however, not merely as
a tool for a specific society. However, as her own example of Finland shows, while a country
with a strong sense of interconnection between citizens and wide support for social security,
can also be very reluctant to take in refugees, and the normalization of far right nativism
that Mudde talks about has also happened in countries with more social cohesion and far
better social security than the US.
According to Nussbaum, the most promising, “positive and helpful” emotion for establishing
“decent” societies and political systems is compassion, and she envisions the good society
as one where we cultivate a “public culture of  compassion” (Nussbaum 2013,157).  An
interesting point to notice here is that while compassion also was the prime virtue for
Rousseau, his “Spartan” vision of  the good society was extremely “masculine”,  and its
emotions  (shame,  honor  etc.)  as  Nussbaum points  out,  resembled those of  the  ancién
regime. Nussbaum’s “love and compassion” offers an alternative, more “feminine” register
of positive political emotions as well as discouraging emotions such as fear, envy, shame,
and disgust that can erode support for what she deems good political causes.
Nussbaum defines compassion as ”a painful emotion directed at the serious suffering of
another creature” and distinguishes it from empathy – the ability to imagine the situation of
the other, taking the other’s perspective (Nussbaum 2013,142).  For Nussbaum, compassion
is not only a private emotion but also a collective one, and she claims that although our
compassion is often partial and narrow, we are able to widen our circle of concern up to the
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national  level  –  and  beyond –  through education  (ibid).  Hence,  compassion  should  be
practiced  in  schools  and  other  institutions  with  the  help  of  literature  and  role-play
(Nussbaum 2013, 276–279). As sympathetic as I find Nussbaum’s vision of a compassionate
society (and it is certainly hard to dislike) I would like to problematize this idea of a political
culture of compassion and ask if there are some points in Arendt’s rather infamous criticism
of compassion and pity in On Revolution that may cause us to approach this strategy of
making society better by fostering ”a culture of compassion” with some restraint. [9]
 
Arendt: Compassion as a-political
Arendt’s view of compassion as a visceral basic emotion is comparable to Nussbaum’s, but
unlike Nussbaum she does not think that compassion could ever be a public sentiment.
Compassion is being “touched in the flesh” – it is a literal “passion”, something we suffer –
and hence a direct reaction to individual and concrete suffering that relates to persons in
their singularity. (Arendt 2006 b, 80). In compassion, we suffer with another person as a
response to the suffering one perceives in them, and as such, compassion is limited to a
personal connection between individuals. Compassion is therefore essentially an apolitical
emotion according to Arendt. Like love, it abolishes distance, “the worldly space between
men were political matters, the whole realm of human affairs, are located” (Arendt, 2006 b,
76). Political interaction on the other hand, involves a certain distance according to Arendt,
because it consists of speech “in which someone talks to somebody about something that is
of interest to both because it inter-ests, it is between them.
This  relation  is  reminiscent  of  what  the  Norwegian  philosopher  Skjervheim  calls  a
“triangular relation” which characterizes a genuine intersubjective dialogue. In a triangular
relation, I respond to an utterance by directing my attention to the same subject matter in
such  a  way  that  we  share  a  common  object  as  participants  (Skjervheim,  1996).  The
alternative relation is that of the spectator, to merely register the other’s utterances, or
infer his/her motives and thus make the other into my object. According to Arendt, this
“triangular” relation is alien to compassion, which is directed only at the suffering person.
In so far as compassion actually sets out to change the world, it tends to claim swift and
even violent action, rather than persuasion, negotiation and compromise, which Arendt sees
as the very substance of political life (Arendt 2006b, 77).
A further complication with evoking compassion as a political emotion is what Arendt refers
to as “the darkness of the human heart” which she contrasts to the “light” of the public
sphere.  This notion of “the darkness of the human heart” points to the fact that we are
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never fully transparent to ourselves. The reason for her skepticism towards emotions in
politics is not that the devalues them, but as Degerman points out, that we cannot truly
know  ourselves,  nor  fully  trust  ourselves  either,  since  our  emotional  life  is  radically
subjective, ambivalent, conflictual and changeable. (Degerman 2019, 156). Arendt has a
radically relational view of selfhood and reality, our very sense of ourselves as “someone” is
dependent on our appearing to others through ”words and deeds”, and our capacity to make
and keep promises, which likewise depends on others (Arendt, 1958, 237). Likewise, our
sense of the reality and objectivity of the world is provided by the presence of others who
see what we see and relate to the same objects. According to Arendt, what does not appear
in a common world remains dream-like and without reality.
For us,  appearance—something that  is  being seen and heard by others  as  well  as  by
ourselves—constitutes reality. Compared with the reality which comes from being seen and
heard, even the greatest forces of intimate life—the passions of the heart, the thoughts of
the mind, the delights of the senses—lead an uncertain, shadowy kind of existence unless
and until they are transformed, deprivatized and deindividualized, as it were, into a shape to
fit them for public appearance. (Arendt 1958, 50)
The  expression  or  representation  of  an  emotion  transforms  something  subjective  and
involuntary  –  the  experienced  emotion  –  into  something  communicable.  What  is
intersubjectively “real” and objective is therefore not my emotion, but an appearance, it is
my representation of the emotion that can be seen, heard and evaluated by others. And in
the  political  sphere  appearances  are  all  there  is  (Arendt  1958,179-80,  193).  Arendt’s
contention is that when compassion “goes public” as it where, it stops being an emotion and
changes into something else – the sentiment of pity; being sorry without being “stricken in
the flesh”: “Pity, because it is not stricken in the flesh and keeps its sentimental distance,
can succeed where compassion always will  fail;  it  can reach out to the multitude and
therefore, like solidarity, enter the market-place” (Arendt 2006b, 79).
A sentiment is a feeling evoked by and directed at an abstract depersonalized mage of
“suffering masses” rather than immediately perceived particular persons (Arendt 2006b, 75,
80), and it is without limits –“boundless”– and leads to an insensitivity to reality, which in
the case of the French revolutionaries turned into cruelty: “…it has been the boundlessness
of their sentiments that made revolutionaries so curiously insensitive to reality in general
and to the reality of persons in particular, whom they felt no compunctions in sacrificing to
their ‘principles’” (Arendt 2006b, p. 80).
Compassion and the specter of hypocrisy
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According  to  Arendt,  Robespierre  and  the  revolutionaries  –Inspired  by  Rousseau–  saw
compassion as a universal and natural basis for human relations and politics (Arendt 2006b,
71). Their conception of compassion’s goodness stemmed from the idea that the subjective
experience of compassion was – in itself – good. However since this emotion only exists
within “the darkness of an individual’s heart”, we can never know for sure that a person
actually harbors this emotion. Of course, there are actions associated with compassion, but
it is also a subjective emotional experience that cannot appear to others directly as such. As
Degerman points out, “The French revolutionaries developed a veritable repertoire of pity –
conspicuous crying at public events, calculated simplicity of dress, etc. – to demonstrate
their pity to others. They quickly realized, however, that a show of pity could simply mask
the absence of feeling within”. (Degerman 2019, 166).
Arendt’s simple point here is that that words and deeds can never unambiguously prove the
presence of authentic emotions in the political sphere. If compassion is seen as a political
virtue, the impossibility of confirming the authenticity of another person’s feelings (and our
own for that matter) becomes an insoluble problem since every expression can be seen as
potentially hypocritical: “…the search for motives, the demand that everybody display in
public his innermost motivation, since it is actually impossible, transforms all actors into
hypocrites; the moment the display of motives begins, hypocrisy begins to poison all human
relations.”  (Arendt  2006  b,  88).  According  to  Arendt,  the  obsession  with  unmasking
appearances in a field where only appearances exist lead Robespierre and his followers to
an endless hunt for hypocrites and traitors that transformed Robespierre’s dictatorship into
the Reign of Terror (Arendt 2006b, 89). While I certainly do not think that Nussbaum’s
“public culture of compassion” would lead anyone to the guillotine, I would argue that a
public culture of compassion faces risks of its own.
 
The pitfalls of pity
Central for Nussbaum’s vision is the idea of human equality, that all human beings are
worthy of equal respect or regard, just in virtue of their humanity. If we are to believe
Pankaj Mishra however, it is precisely this same belief in equality that breeds resentment;
the problem is not that we do not value equality sufficiently, but that our societies fail to
deliver  it.  In  her  article  ”The  Pitfalls  of  ‘Love  and  Kindness’:  On  the  Challenges  to
Compassion/Pity as a Political Emotion” Anne-Kathrin Weber points to another inherent
tension in Nussbaum’s emphasis on compassion/pity and equality. Pity, she argues, involves
a ”dual-level hierarchisation” between a) those who are miserable and those who ought to
pity them, and b) between the virtuous (those who pity) and those who do not pity. Pity
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establishes a hierarchy between the subject and the object of pity; with the result that we
feel an immediate urge to help others, to rescue them, as Weber puts it: “making politics for
them, and not with them” (Weber 2018, 56). In other words, pity does not encourage the
triangular relation (me-you-our common object) but tends to objectify the ones that are
pitied.
Nussbaum suggests that by teaching citizens to love equality, freedom, liberal democratic
institutions and other people, we could create a more just society; the hope is, in other
words, that we can instill citizens with particular emotions in order to improve our societies.
While I have no argument whatsoever with Nussbaum’s view that art and poetry can teach
us valuable emotional lessons that might have political relevance, I think that to explicitly
cultivate compassion as a political sentiment faces some challenges. One of the worries
expressed by Weber is connected to the second hierarchy of pity, namely that an “emotion
programme” such as Nussbaum’s “might potentially clash with the pluralistic and diverse
(political) interests of each individual” and hence resemble an attempt to inflict a single
political “popular will” in the shape of “rules of feeling” onto citizens (Weber 2018, 57). Or
to  put  it  a  different  way:  If  Müller  is  correct  in  diagnosing  populism as  a  particular
moralistic imagination  of  politics that sets an (imagined) morally pure and fully united
people against corrupt and immoral elites (Müller 2006,19-20) and that populism’s threat to
democracy  consists  in  its  suppression  of  pluralism,  would  not  a  political  culture  of
compassion only risk to increase the tendency of moralizing political debates? How we
frame a political conflict matters; to frame it is moral or cultural terms rather than in terms
of  economy  or  a  conflict  of  interests  strengthens  populism  according  to  Müller,  and
populists will attempt to moralize political conflicts as much as possible (Müller 2006, 42,
92).
A public culture where emotions such as love and compassion are considered essential
political virtues would certainly give political actors strong incentives to appear loving and
compassionate notwithstanding how they actually feel.  Moreover,  such a public culture
would also demand strong expressions of these emotions in order for the speaker to appear
as  authentically  loving and compassionate.  [10]   We do not  need any punishment  for
appearing “unloving”– sheer peer-pressure (which Nussbaum also is aware of as a problem)
would suffice. A public culture of love and compassion risks being haunted by the old
specter of hypocrisy, since, as Arendt reminds us:  “…however heartfelt a motive might be,
once it is brought out and exposed for public inspection it becomes an object of suspicion
rather than insight.” (Arendt 2006b, 86). If our emotions, rather than what we want to
change or preserve in the world, take center place, authenticity of appearance becomes
paramount with the result that being emotionally honest can easily trump (pun intended)
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being  factually  truthful.  As  Harry  Frankfurt  points  out  in  his  book  On  Bullshit,  the
bullshitter is – like the hypocrite – concerned with the impression he makes, but while the
hypocrite misrepresents his feelings and character rather than facts, the bullshitter – who
simply does not care about the facts– might very well provide a honest representations of
himself  (Frankfurt, 2005, 67).
As Arendt often reminds us, human affairs are fundamentally unpredictable; since political
action always takes place within a ‘web of relationships’ among plural individuals. This web
is itself active and reactive, and new players and new ways of playing the game enter the
scene continuously, and what an action finally amounts to in the public sphere, is not under
the agent’s control (Arendt, 1958, 190). The outcome of an action might be completely
different from what we counted on, and we never quite know what we are doing when we
act “into the web of interrelationships and mutual dependencies that constitute the field of
action” (Arendt 2005, 56). A fairly obvious problem in this context is that if a political
culture of compassion is seen as compulsory and mandated “from above” it might just as
well  backfire and create more resentment towards the progressive social  changes that
Nussbaum supports.  I  think  this  is  actually  something  we see  pretty  clearly  today  in
American  (and  internet)  debates  in  which  alt-right  memes  such  as  “PC-culture”,
“snowflakery”, “victim-culture”, “virtue-signaling” and “oppression Olympics” have become
common catchphrases.  In  short,  I  suspect  that  institutionalizing compassion only  risks
deepening resentment, rather than defusing the “letter bomb” described by Kimmel.
 
Solidarity vs. Pity – The role of principles
Fortunately, Arendt has an alternative to pity – namely the principle of solidarity. While the
abstract sentiment of pity tends to lead us to see others as an abstract mass of sufferers,
solidarity responds to suffering by deliberately establishing a community of interest with the
oppressed and exploited (Arendt 2006b, 79). Solidarity may be aroused by suffering, but not
guided by it, and might appear “colder” than love, because it is committed to ideas like the “
‘the grandeur of man’, or the honor of the human race’, or the dignity of man” (ibid.).
Solidarity is a principle, and thus not the same as an emotion, feeling or inner motivation, it
is not located in the “darkness of the human heart” but appears and “shines” in public, that
is, it is made manifest in the performance of the act itself and does not require people to
infer the agent’s motive or feelings (Arendt 2006, 88). Political principles vary with different
polities and periods in history, and a part from Montesquieu’s honor, virtue and fear she
mentions freedom, justice, equality – and solidarity (Arendt 2005,195).
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A principle is not ”in” the subject but “inspire from without” as she comments in ’What is
Freedom?’ A principle is more general than particular goals, but the goals of an action
might be judged in light of its principle. While political action is notoriously unpredictable,
even a “failed” action that does not reach its goal can exhibit its principle and thus inspire
further action, since the principle of an action can be manifested again and again. (Arendt
2006a, 151). The appeal of principles are also emotional, and Arendt is not as dismissive of
emotions as she is often portrayed, and she is quite clear that absence of emotion does not
promote rationality:  “In order to respond reasonably one must first of all be ‘moved’, and
the opposite of emotional is not ‘rational,’ whatever that may mean, but either the inability
to be moved, usually a pathological phenomenon, or sentimentality which is a perversion of
feeling” (Arendt 1972, 161).
Arendt actually shares Mishra and Nussbaum’s criticism of the notion of ”enlightened self-
interest” as the basis for interest in the common good. A public good cannot be equaled with
self-interest,  however  “enlightened”  it  might  be,  in  that  it  has  a  different  temporal
character; a common good belongs to the world, which outlasts the lifespan of the individual
(Arendt 1972, 78). The ”public good” – the concerns we share as citizens– are and quite
frequently  antagonistic  to  whatever  we  may  deem  good  to  ourselves  in  our  private
existence.[11] What is central to Arendt is that the common good is a public ”thing”– it is
something  in-between us  that  unites  and  separates  us  at  the  same time.  Institutions,
material structures, artworks and infrastructure are things that make up an objective in-
between, that can be seen and approached from different viewpoints. Principles share in
this “objective” quality due to their visibility and repeatability, while our inner feelings or
attitudes can never be public objects in a similar way.
Arendt’s insistence on the separation of the moral and the political is tied to her view that
politics is always about the world we share; moral considerations always turns towards the
self and our conscience, while political considerations are directed towards the good of the
world (Arendt, 2003, 153). Political evils demand political answers, and these must be found
in  the  space  in-between,  and  not  within  the  moral  life  of  the  individual.  From  the
perspective  of  the  world,  our  inner  motives  (be  it  anger  or  compassion)  are  of  little
relevance, what matters is that a wrong has been done in the world (Arendt 1972, 62 and
2005, 106). The danger of making emotions explicitly political is that our focus becomes
individualized – either by focusing on “our own hearts” or as various form of unmasking,
diagnosing or pathologizing the other – rather than being about the world, a situation
Arendt compares to the “weirdness” of a spiritual séance:
What makes mass society so difficult to bear is not the number of people involved, or at
least not primarily, but the fact that the world between them has lost its power to gather
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them together, to relate and to separate them. The weirdness of this situation resembles a
spiritualistic séance where a number of people gathered around a table might suddenly,
through some magic trick, see the table vanish from their midst, so that two persons sitting
opposite each other were no longer separated but also would be entirely unrelated to each
other by anything tangible.  (Arendt 1958, 53)
 
Conclusion
When it comes to the question of how Kimmel’s ”letter bomb” can be defused, answers
varies with how the problem is understood – whether it is framed in economic, political,
psychological or cultural terms. Is it anger or resentment itself that is the problem, or is it,
as Kimmel suggests rather that it has the wrong address? Kimmel, Piketty and Müller all
points to neoliberalism, downward social mobility and inequality as driving the populist
right, while others – like Mudde and Norris– see the rise of authoritarian populism as first
and foremost an expression of a social and cultural conflict.[12] Müller, who is wary of
psychologizing the rise of populism in terms of ”fear”, “anger” and ”resentment” (which he
sees  as  patronizing  and  condescending)  in  addition  points  to  political  –  rather  than
economical–  reasons  for  the  upsurge of  populism,  namely  the  weakening of  the  party
system. Populism is strong in places with weak party systems, and where populism claims to
represent ”the people” as a whole, oppositional parties precisely represents ”parts” of the
people, and hence have an antipopulist meaning (Müller, 2016, p. 79). Müller suggests that
a technocratic view of politics has paved the way for populism – in fact, they mirror each
other: In a technocratic politics there is only one correct policy, in populism there is only
one authentic will of the people– in neither case is there a need for democratic debate.[13]
If the rule of experts has played a part in ushering in authoritarian populism, it is not likely
that the threat to liberal democracy that it represents can be solved by experts – if we value
our institutions we must engage in them as citizens. The resiliency of institutions, laws and
political principles is not something that can be simply decided by politicians or professional
policy makers or taught to school children (for example) but depend on citizens’ active
engagement.  There  appears  to  be  a  curiously  non-conflictual  backdrop  to  the  picture
Nussbaum paints;  I  would  suspect  that  organizing  for  political  power  (in  the  form of
organized labor for example) would be rather more effective in pushing progressive politics
than making the wealthy more compassionate?
Arendt muses in The Promise of Politics  that the sociological and psychological gaze is
profoundly unpolitical in fixing upon man rather than the world, since we cannot “change
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the world by changing the people in it” (Arendt 2005, 105-106). Mishra and Nussbaum are
undoubtedly right, however, in claiming that the political is not just about rational interests
but also always about emotions,  and that  the liberal  tradition’s  ”rational  subject”  is  a
simplified fiction is even supported by findings in neurology and cognitive science. However,
I think there are reasons to be skeptical of singling out specific subjective emotions as
inherently ”good” or ”bad” for politics independent of context. One would be hard pressed
to find anything constructive in Mishras ”ressentment”, but I am not convinced that anger
and fear are always ”bad” and compassion always an unadulterated good in political life.
[14] ”Negative” emotions like fear and anger can prompt us to political action in order avoid
disasters and correct injustices – like taking to the streets in indignation and solidarity when
the principle of justice is violated.[15]
Compassion – being touched by the suffering of others– is undoubtedly a morally  good
emotion, and perhaps even the most essential one –but as I have tried to argue here, if it is
always a beneficial political sentiment is more dubious. One lesson we can take from Arendt
is her insistence that political deliberation and action must be about the world and not about
our ”hearts”. Referring to Rousseau, Arendt comments: ”while the plight of others aroused
his heart, he became involved in his heart rather than in the sufferings of others (…)”
(Arendt  2006,  78).  Moral  considerations  tends  to  be  directed  towards  ourselves,  our
conscience, emotions and what kind of person we want to be, but this involvement in ”the
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[1] There has been a lot of discussion on how precisely to define the widely used label
”populism”. I will here use the term in accordance with Jan-Werner Müller who defines
populism as containing several interrelated features, all of which must be present: Anti-
pluralism, moralization of the political, anti-elitism and exclusion. While not being anything
like a unified doctrine, populism has its own ”inner logic; it is always a form of identity
politics (although the reverse does not hold) where the populist party, leader or movement
identifies  as  the  true  representative  of  an  –imagined,  and  ultimately  purely  symbolic–
homogenous, unified people (in the singular) against a corrupt elite, and where opponens
are seen as enemies of  ”the people”.  The core claim of populism is that ”only some of the
people are really the people”.  See Müller, What is Populism? (2016, p 19-20, 21, 29).
[2]  The psychology professor in question was James Averill,  and the anecdote is  from
Charles Duhigg: ”The Real Roots of American Rage–The untold story of how anger became
the dominant emotion in our politics and personal lives — and what we can do about it” in
The Atlantic, January/February 2019.
[3] Kimmel thus has a rather vaguer and much wider notion of populism than Müller, which
allows him to classify Bernie Sanders as a left-wing populist, which Müller emphaticly does
not.
[4] Thomas Piketty, ”We must rethink globalization, or Trumpism will prevail”, The
Guardian, Nov, 16, 2016.
[5] The angry right is thus an intersection of race, class and gender; about 80 percent of all
the jobs lost in the aftermath of the economic crisis in 2008 in the US were jobs held by
men,  (Kimmel  2017,15)  and   the  lower  middle  class;  independent  farmers,  small
shopkeepers, craft and highly skilled workers, and small-scale entrepreneurs has been hit
hardest by globalization. (ibid., 245).
[6] “They believed that there was a contract between themselves, and guys like them, and
the government “of the people” that is supposed to represent us. They believed in the
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corporations that they worked for, confident in the knowledge that they could support a
family, enjoy a secure retirement, and provide for their families. That contract was the
stable  foundation  for  several  generations  of  America’s  working  men—an  implied  but
inviolable  understanding  between  businesses  and  workers,  between  government  and
employers. They had kept the faith, fulfilled their part of the bargain. And somehow their
share had been snatched away by faceless, feckless hands. They had played by all the rules,
only to find the game was rigged from the start.” (Kimmel 2017, 202).
[7] “It’s not that their path upward is blocked; it’s that the downward pressure from above is
pushing them downward into the ranks of the marginalized. “They” might deserve to be
down there, but “we” do not. Their revolt is, therefore, nostalgic, pessimistic, reactionary.”
(Kimmel 2017, xiii).
[8] See Mishra 2017, 327, 333 and H-Diplo Roundtable Review Volume XX, No. 44, 2 July
2019.
[9]  My  presentation  here  owes  much  to  Dan  Degerman   (2019)  “Within  the  heart’s
darkness:  The role of emotions in Arendt’s political thought” and Anne-Kathrin Weber
(2018) “The Pitfalls of ‘Love and Kindness’: On the Challenges to Compassion/Pity as a
Political Emotion”.
[10] Weber uses Hillary Clintons campaign video titled: “Love and Kindness” as an example
example of the hierarchization and the “magic feeling” involved in compassion, and I would
add,  the  stress  on emotion in  the  video combined with  vagueness  regarding concrete
policies also makes it a prime target for a suspicion of hypocrisy.
[11] See Arendt 1977, ”Public Rights and Private interests” from: Small comforts in hard
times, p.105. This text is also one of the few instances where Arendt appears to soften the
political/social divide in that she explicitly states that equality demands getting people out of
poverty: ”Before we ask the poor for idealim, we must first make them citizens: and ths
involves so changing the circumstances of their private lives that they can become capable
of enjoying ’the public’”. (ibid., 106- 107).
[12] See Mudde, p 101. Comparative political scientist Pippa Norris has also argued that
income level is not a reliable predictor of support for authoritarian parties, which is better
understood as a cultural backlash against social change. In her view, economic conditions
and material insecurity are not the ”motor” but rather the accelerant of the ”authoritarian
reflex”. See Pippa Norris, “It’s Not Just Trump,” Washington Post, March 11, 2016.
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[13] Here he has more in common with conflictual political theorists such as Chantal Mouffe
who claims that the convergence of political parties, as well as the compulsion to reach
consensus has provoked antiliberal countermovements. See Müller 2016, 53 and 97.
[14] Nussbaum tends to focus on the counterprodutiveness of  anger but as Srinivasan
(2018) has argued, justified anger can be apt even though it is counterproductive, as a way
of appreciating injustice,  and that the situation of  oppressed groups who must choose
between  getting  aptly  angry  or  acting  prudentially  suffers  what  she  calls  ”affective
injustice”.
[15] As is happening now in the US while I am writing this (June 2020). When it comes to
fear,  Nussbaum sees  it  as  a  ”narrowing”  and centrifugal  emotion  that  it  dissipates  a
people’s potentially united energy for a common project (Nussbaum 2013, 323) but the
younger generation’s activism against global warming is driven by a very reasonable fear
for the future; in the face of ecological disaster one cannot ”save oneself” alone. The relative
swiftness of the concrete policies established in most European countries facing the Covid
19 pandemic, compared to the tardy response to climate change is telling. In the latter case
we are obviously not sufficiently scared.
Share this:
Share
